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How to Improve the Debt Ceiling to Fit a
Partisan Government: A Global Examination
of Which International Solutions Excel
SARAH LOV*
ABSTRACT
This Note explores the changing role the debt ceiling has played
within the United States and considers how that role should be altered
moving forward. The debt ceiling's history and its political connections
are discussed as a backdrop to how the United States might alter the
debt ceiling to limit both future government shutdown and political
gridlock. This Note examines both domestic and international solutions
to the debt ceiling problem with an emphasis on the latter. In particular,
the Note focuses on the possible international solution of adopting a
system similar to Denmark's debt ceiling,' or adopting a high debt-to-
GDP ratio, similar to other non-U.S. countries.2
INTRODUCTION
For something as inoffensive-sounding as the debt ceiling, the
American debt limit is an economic tool that, if not raised when
necessary, can lead to "chaotic disruption" on an international economic
scale. 3 The debt ceiling is a limit that Congress sets to prevent the
United States government from spending over a prescribed amount of
federal gross debt. 4 The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
labels this debt as "debt held by the public and debt held in government
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
1. See Shalifay, 7 Countries with Debt Ceilings or Limits, INv. FRONTIER (Oct. 8,
2013), http://www.investmentfrontier.com/2013/10/08/7-countries-with-debt-ceilings-or-lim
its/.
2. See id.
3. See Jeanne Sahadi, 7 Things You Need to Know About the Debt Ceiling (Yes, That
Again), CNN MONEY (Oct. 15, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/14/news/economy/debt-
ceiling/.
4. See id.
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accounts." 5 This debt covers anything from U.S. bonds to government
programs like Social Security and Medicare. 6 Each year, when the
United States spends more money than it creates in revenue, a budget
deficit results, and the national debt increases. 7 The difference in
spending versus revenue controls the budget deficit.8 When the debt
limit is raised, it does not "create more spending or larger deficits." 9
Instead, each time a debt ceiling is increased, it accommodates the bills
already in place that have passed through the annual budget proposal. 10
Internationally, a debt ceiling is often implemented to inform
"foreign investors of the country's dedication to fiscal discipline."" It is
separate from the United States' annual budgeting process and "serves
as an independent statutory limit on the total nominal value of U.S.
sovereign debt." 12 The debt ceiling is a statutory law, 13 and there is a
global expectation that the United States honors its rule of law, 14 and as
a result, will enforce its self-imposed debt limits.
The debt ceiling is a flawed device meant to ensure the United
States does not become overly indebted and economically unsound. 15
Due to the increasing partisan division surrounding the debt ceiling, an
international examination of the practice becomes vital. For this reason,
the fact that many analysts are open with their disdain for the debt
ceiling measure is discouraging. 16 Indeed, the U.S debt ceiling has often
5. Kelleigh Irwin Fagan, The Best Choice Out of Poor Options: What the Government
Should Do (or Not Do) If Congress Fails to Raise the Debt Ceiling, 46 IND. L. REV. 205, 210
(2013).
6. See id.
7. See Chad Stone, Federal Spending and the Debt Limit, CBPP (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://www.cbpp.org/federal-budget/federal-spending-and-the-debt-limit.
8. See id.
9. Kathy Ruffing & Chad Stone, Separating the Debt Limit From the Deficit Problem,
CBPP (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/research/separating-the-debt-limit-from-the-
deficit-problem-0.
10. See id.
11. Shalifay, 7 Countries with Debt Ceilings or Limits, INV. FRONTIER (Oct. 8, 2013),
http://www.investmentfrontier.com/2013/10/08/7-countries-with-debt-ceilings-or-limits/.
12. See Michael D. Arena, The Legal Frameworks Governing Sovereign Debt and
Borrowing in the United States And European Union, 20 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 283, 289
(2014).
13. See id.
14. See Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, The Significance of the Rule of Law and Its Implications
for the European Union and the United States, 72 U. PITT L. REV. 229, 231 (2010)
(providing a helpful definition of what the rule of law means today).
15. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 135, 135-37 (2005).
16. See Jaime Fuller, Debt-ceiling explainers, explained, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/02/06/debt-ceiling-explainers-
explained/; Chad Stone, If We Have to Have a Debt Ceiling, Let's Do It Like the Danes, US
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been described disreputably and has received more condemnation than
praise from both legal and economic experts. 17 Because the conversation
surrounding the debt ceiling can often only lead to the consideration of
one solution,1S the purpose of this Note is to list both domestic and
international solutions by using other countries' methods of debt limits
as a comparative lens to shed light on how America can improve its
maligned debt ceiling.
Part I of this Note covers the history of the debt ceiling in America
and discusses the effect partisan behavior has had on the process of
raising debt ceiling and the domestic and international impacts of the
American debt crisis. Part II explores how debt ceilings and limits are
instituted and used internationally. Part III delves into solutions that
could be implemented to help America avoid future debt crises and
proposes to adopt either a much higher debt ceiling or debt-to-GDP ratio
as explained in Part IV. Part V contains the conclusion that reiterates
both the importance of using one of the two international solutions to
prevent political partisanship and the limited scope of the argument.
This Note argues that America should adopt Belgium's plan of lifting
the debt ceiling and, if not possible, should look to other countries for
examples of using a debt-to-GDP ratio to stem the partisan-fueled debt
crises. 19
I. HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN DEBT CEILING
Historically, the power to control the debt limit rests with Congress
as one part of its fiscal-related powers. 20 Under U.S. Constitution
Article I, § 8:
Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
the United States; To borrow Money on the credit of the
NEWS (June 13, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/
06/13/gop-debt-ceiling-hostages-and-denmarks-good-idea.
17. See Sahadi, supra note 3; see also Fuller, supra note 16 (describing the debt ceiling
as "confusing and boring"); Stone, supra note 16 (referring to the debt limit
"simultaneously a meaningless anachronism and a dangerous political football").
18. See, e.g., James Surowiecki, Smash the Ceiling, NEW YORKER (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/08/01/smash-the-ceiling.
19. See Stone, supra note 16; see also Shalifay, supra note 11 (detailing debt limit and
ceiling information from various countries).
20. See Krishnakumar, supra note 15, at 135.
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United States. . . . To coin Money, regulate the Value
thereof, and of foreign Coin. 21
While the Constitution invested Congress with the authority to regulate
debt in America, the legislative branch had no statutory law to aid in its
control of sovereign debt until 1917.22 Instead, Congress "approved each
individual issuance of debt made on the nation's behalf." 23
With the passage of the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, the
legislature was able to better check the United States' debt to creditorS 24
and to hold the executive branch's spending accountable. 25 This statute
gave the Secretary of the Treasury partial "borrowing power" and the
"standing authority to issue debt without individual congressional
approval, up to a specified limit." 26 In addition to issuing debt, the
Secretary of the Treasury was also given the "discretion... to set the
amounts, terms, and conditions of federal obligations." 27 The Second
Liberty Bond Act was considered to be "a precursor" to the current debt
ceiling America has in place. 28
In 1939, Congress transformed the debt ceiling by simplifying it into
the form seen today. 29 Congress created the present debt ceiling by
shedding its "disparate limits on discrete series of bonds and other debt
instruments" and by creating "a single aggregate limit on all U.S.
government obligations covering nearly every form of public debt." 30
Over time, this limit must be raised to meet rising debt obligations.31
From 1960 to January 2018, Congress has altered the debt ceiling "78
separate times to permanently raise, temporarily extend, or revise the
definition of the debt limit." 32 Reaching further back in time, the data
becomes more astounding-from 1940 to October of 2015, there were an
astounding ninety-five measures to change the debt ceiling in
America. 33 Presently, the United States' debt limit has been suspended
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cis. 1-2, 5.
22. See Krishnakumar, supra note 15, at 135-36.
23. Id.
24. See Arena, supra note 12, at 289.
25. See Surowiecki, supra note 18.
26. Krishnakumar, supra note 15, at 136.
27. Arena, supra note 12, at 289.
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. Debt Limit, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Pages/debt
limit.aspx (last updated Jan. 30, 2018).
33. Sahadi, supra note 3.
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at 20.456 trillion dollars until March 1, 2019.34 However, according to
the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, once the suspension
ends the United States' debt limit "could be reset as high as $22
trillion [."35
A. American Partisanship
Over time, partisan division played more of a central role
concerning the debt ceiling. Though setting the debt ceiling is separate
from Congressional bills on spending or reduction in taxes, getting a
ceiling lifted can be politically conflict-ridden. 36 In 1987, when President
Ronald Reagan prepared to sign that year's debt ceiling law, the U.S.
News Managing Editor, Robert Schlesinger, wrote that the change was
a "sign of how Washington has transformed from a go-along-to-get-along
deal-making culture to one of endless, vituperative confrontation." 37 The
trend further emerged in 1995 when Republican Newt Gingrich refused
to set up a vote "until Bill Clinton had signed on to a GOP balanced
budget plan," which revealed a politician more beholden to his agenda
than to avoiding "the price" of default.38 Yet politics became even more
divisive following the midterm elections in 2010 when Republicans in
the House of Representatives decided to embrace a "novel political
strategy." 39
House Republicans decided that they would use the debt ceiling to
create political stand-offs to push for partisan laws or changes that they
might not be able to get passed through conventional means. 40 As they
used the debt ceiling in an attempt to push their agenda, they also
presented the president as the only one in favor of raising the ceiling. 41
Through this tactic, Republicans against raising the ceiling could
outwardly appear to be fiscally conservative "[r]ather than simply
34. Jeanne Sahadi, The Sneaky Way Congress Plans to Raise the Debt Ceiling, CNN
MONEY (Feb. 9, 2018, 10:24 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/02/08/news/economy/debt-
limit/index.html.
35. Id.
36. Sahadi, supra note 3.
37. Robert Schlesinger, A Debt Ceiling History Lesson, US NEWS (Oct. 11, 2013),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/10/11/the-history-of-raising-the-debt-ceiling-
from-ronald-reagan-to-bill-clinton-and-newt-gingrich.
38. See id.
39. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Don't End or Audit the Fed: Central Bank
Independence in an Age of Austerity, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 52 (2016).
40. See id.
41. See id.
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conceding that the debt ceiling's level would need to be adjusted in light
of congressional enactments." 42
On the other side of the political aisle, Democratic President Obama
adopted his own strategy after summer 2011 to deal with fiscal
situations when the debt limit needed to be raised.43 President Obama
told Congress "that he would only accept a 'clean' debt ceiling increase"
without any discussion of "unrelated issues." 44 This strategy seemed to
prove effective; Obama's "opponents did indeed blink each time that a
debt ceiling increase was required" during this period.45 An increase to
the debt ceiling was either approved every time, or Congress would
"'suspend' the debt ceiling temporarily and reset the limit to a higher
level when the ceiling is later reinstated." 46 Congress was unwilling to
risk the consequences that would arise from leaving the debt ceiling
unchanged; 47 however, this political game of chicken between the
parties often left Americans stuck in the middle, waiting for one side to
concede. 48
The most memorable stalemate worth highlighting occurred
between Republicans and President Obama in 2013.49 During this
period there was "a fierce partisan standoff' that "brought the United
States to the brink of defaulting on its sovereign debt obligations."5 0 On
October 17, 2013, the stalemate broke, and President Obama was able
to sign an agreement that "ended a two-week shutdown of the federal
government."51 There remains a strong possibility these events will
happen again in the future. 52 In February of 2016, Republicans in the
House of Representatives declared in a report that they now "regard the
stare-down strategy as a bluff that they are now prepared to call." 53
House Republicans seem to believe "failure to raise the debt ceiling
would impose no special hardship-and certainly no constitutional
42. Id.
43. See id. at 55-59.
44. Id. at 56.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 57 (suggesting that "[i]n that sense, President Obama 'won' the post-2011
debt ceiling standoffs."); Sahadi, supra note 34 (This latter technique, currently employed
under President Trump, is considered a "back-door" or even "sneaky" way of lifting the
debt ceiling.)
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Arena, supra note 12, at 284.
51. Id.
52. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 39, at 57.
53. Id.
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crisis-for the executive branch," an opinion that could encourage future
debt ceiling crises of longer length. 54
At this time, "congressional accountability and periodic fiscal reform
concerning national borrowing and the debt are [now] crucial" because
in the past decades Congress has charted a "trend[] towards inefficient
and excessive borrowing [which] portend[s] future economic difficulties
if left unchecked."55 This trend has resulted in unsettling current debt
figures and alarming future projections. 56 An exploration of our debt
ceiling figures is therefore needed to give perspective to this trend.
A combination of this Congressional infighting and increasing
economic necessity for a higher outstanding debt has culminated in the
debt ceiling reaching about 18.113 trillion dollars, as calculated in late
2015.57 In the past, the United States only borrowed money
"occasionally, in order to finance emergencies or its own expansion" for
such things as "to fund wars, pull itself out of economic depression, or
invest in its own infrastructure." 58 In recent decades, the borrowing has
increased into an annual affair "simply to pay the overall cost of
programs authorized by Congress and the President."5 9 This change in
borrowing can be attributed to many causes, the most prominent being
the nation's latest economic depression in 2008.60 A large amount of the
deficit, however, remains health care costs associated with Social
Security and Medicaid. 61
In late 2016, America's public debt amounted to slightly more than
75 percent of its gross domestic product, an alarming sum given the
percentage in 2010 was 56 percent, and, in 2005, was only around 35
percent. 62 Additionally, based on the nation's current trend, the
Congressional Budget Office estimates that public debt in America in
2026 will account for 86 percent of its gross domestic product.63 If the
prediction extends further into the future, the estimates reveal bleaker
54. Id.
55. Krishnakumar, supra note 15, at 137.
56. See generally Stone, supra note 7 (providing general insight to the current state of
U.S. debt).
57. See Sahadi, supra note 3.
58. Krishnakumar, supra note 15, at 137.
59. Id.
60. See Jacob Davidson, How Much Does America's Huge National Debt Actually
Matter?, TIME, (Dec. 18, 2016), http://time.com/4214269/us-national-debt/ (pointing out
that the national debt has almost doubled after "the financial crisis" the country faced).
61. See id.
62. See Federal Debt Held by the Public as Percent of Gross Domestic Product, FRED,
(last updated Dec. 21, 2016), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYGFGDQ 188S.
63. See Davidson, supra note 60. But see Stone, supra note 7 (making the remark that
this 2026 prediction should be kept in perspective with the past, when the debt was over
106 percent in 1946).
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figures: in three decades, the Congressional Budget Office predicts the
public debt will equate to 155 percent of its gross domestic product. 64
These figures conclusively point to the realization that lawmakers are
facing, and will increasingly face, a financial dilemma in which
decisions must be made to balance spending and taxes within the
United States to stem the rise of public debt. 65
B. The Impact of a Debt Ceiling Crisis
In December 2012, the U.S. Treasury reached the limit of how much
the country could borrow when the government debt reached a total of
16.39 trillion dollars. 66 Because the United States' ability to borrow is
restricted by statute, it was necessary to gain Congress's approval to
raise the debt ceiling.67 If the debt ceiling were not increased, the ceiling
would hinder America's ability to pay for key services, such as financing
its national defense or providing payouts through Medicare and Social
Security. 68 As explained, this was just one example out of many debt
ceiling crises that have plagued America since 2010.69 Each time this
limit is met or exceeded through Congress' budget proposals and a debt
ceiling crisis unfolds, the persistent potential consequences arise with
domestic and far-reaching international impacts. 70
If the debt ceiling is not raised, the U.S. Treasury may take
emergency measures in the short term to stave off financial ruin. Such
actions "include under-investing in certain government funds,
suspending the sales of nonmarketable debt, and trimming or delaying
auctions of securities."7 1 If no legislation is passed after these measures
are implemented, the U.S. Treasury would need to "refinance maturing
securities" to delay more disastrous effects.72 This would be a stopgap
measure that would not solve the problem but only reduce the
immediate effects of the economic issue.73
64. Davidson, supra note 60.
65. See Stone, supra note 7 (acknowledging and warning that "[p]olicymakers ... will
have to make hard choices in setting a future course that is both fiscally responsible and
realistic about the levels of spending and taxes appropriate to the country's needs").
66. See Jonathan Masters, U.S. Debt Ceiling: Costs and Consequences, PBS (Nov. 19,
2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/debt-ceiling-1/.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 40, at 57-58.
70. See Stone, supra note 7.
71. Masters, supra note 66.
72. Ruffing & Stone, supra note 9.
73. See Masters, supra note 66.
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A debt ceiling crisis could also likely lead to a substantial drop in
the stock market and United States credit rating downgrades. 74 After
the 2011 debt ceiling incident, Standard and Poor's, a credit-rating
agency, downgraded the U.S. debt.75 Nations heavily put faith into U.S.
Treasury bonds; they "are considered nearly as safe as cash." 76 In fact,
other countries view America as "the safest borrower in the world."77
This is in large part because the United States has always fully paid its
debts "on the date that the federal government has legally committed to
making a payment."78
Should the United States default on its debt, the results would be
catastrophic.79 An American debt crisis would shake the international
economy's confidence in the United States: "Many analysts say
congressional gridlock over the debt limit will likely sow significant
uncertainty in the bond markets and place upward pressure on interest
rates."80 According to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, "The
threat of default in the summer of 2011 fueled economic uncertainty and
badly damaged confidence, even though an agreement ultimately was
reached." 81
II. GLOBAL DEBT CEILINGS OR LIMITS
While countries manage debt in different ways, there are key
techniques countries use to manage or maintain their public debt. 82
Only seven countries follow an obvious debt ceiling or percentage-to-
GDP limit.83 In addition to these techniques, most countries are
members of the International Monetary Fund and support the World
Bank Group. 84 This section will discuss how countries manage
outstanding debt and how the international community deals with
countries falling into economic turmoil.
74. See id. at 4.
75. Ruffing & Stone, supra note 9.
76. Jacob Goldstein, The Debt Ceiling, Explained, NPR (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.npr
.org/sections/money/2011/04/12/135314575/the-debt-ceiling-explained.
77. Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 40, at 58.
78. Id.
79. See Goldstein, supra note 77.
80. Masters, supra note 66.
81. Ruffing & Stone, supra note 9.
82. See Shalifay, supra note 11.
83. Id.
84. See David D. Driscoll, The IMF and the World Bank: How Do They Differ? IMF
(Aug. 1996), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/differ/differ.htm.
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A. Denmark's Debt Limit
America and Denmark are the only two democratic countries that
impose a debt ceiling or debt limit not connected to a debt-to-GDP
ratio.8 5 Therefore, perhaps only by default, Denmark's limit is the most
like the United States'. 86 In Denmark, the debt ceiling is set far ahead of
the country's outstanding debt. In response to the global 2008-2009
recession, Denmark doubled its debt ceiling, "which was already well
above the actual debt, to nearly three times the debt at the
time."8 7 Creating a high debt ceiling means that the country does not
have to consistently amend the debt ceiling, a scenario that has caused
much friction in the United States.88 Before the 2010 modification, the
debt limit was set around 175 billion U.S. dollars.8 9 By 2010, the
country's debt climbed to 75 percent of that figure.9 0 Post-modification,
the debt limit is now around 365 billion U.S. dollars.91
Belgium is a member of the European Union and has a
parliamentary style of government with a multi-party structure. 92 The
nation supplies free college and health care, along with subsidized
childcare. 93 To account for this state support, Danish citizens are
relatively highly taxed; their "total tax revenues is 49% of the size of the
economy, compared to 25.4% in the U.S."9 4 Though there are many
differences between the small country of Denmark and America's
economic powerhouse nation, the former is currently mirroring the
United States by widening the income cap for its citizens.95
85. See Dylan Matthews, Fourteen Countries that Don't Have Debt Ceilings and Are
Not on Fire, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk
/wp/20 13/08/30/fourteen-countries-that-dont-have-debt-ceilings-and-are-not-on-
fire/?utm term=.7e918fl22b0c.
86. See Shalifay, supra note 11.
87. Stone, supra note 16.
88. See id.
89. Shalifay, supra note 11.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Denmark: Government and Politics, DENMARK (Dec. 17, 2016), http://den
mark. dk/en/society/government-and-politics/.
93. Tami Luhby, Actually, Denmark is Becoming More Like Us, AM. OPPORTUNITY (Oct.
23, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/23/news/economy/denmark-inequality/.
94. Id.
95. See id.
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B. Debt Percentage to GDP Countries
Other countries connect their debt ceiling or limit to their global
domestic product (GDP). Countries that follow this debt ceiling
structure are Malaysia and Poland, with their debt ceilings set to fifty-
five percent of the GDP; Pakistan, with sixty percent to GDP; and
Namibia, with a debt ceiling to thirty-five percent GDP.96 In this debt
limit system, the ratio of debt-to-GDP should increase during economic
hardship or in emergency situations, while the ratio should decrease
when the economy rebounds and when no emergencies exist.9 7 One
international flaw that this debt limit creates is one of accountability. 98
Malaysia has already long surpassed its ratio limit, with no internal
consequences or rising of the ratio to accommodate this breach.9 9 In
Poland, where the 2013 figures put the public debt near the top of the
ratio limit, "a fair amount of number massaging" took place to comply
with its debt limit.1 00 Pakistan supposedly breached its debt limit in
2012, and the current circumstances of the country make determining
its current debt ratio an arduous task.101 The United States, then, is
separate from these countries in that it seems "the closest to actually
suffering consequences for 'breaching' its imposed debt limit. 102
C. Global Economic Organizations and Lending Powers
In addition to countries that have a debt ceiling or limit, other
countries may be required to follow a debt-to-GDP limit to join certain
economic organizations. 103 For instance, for a country to join the West
African Economic and Monetary Union, there is a debt limit imposed of
seventy percent debt-to-GDP limit, while the Economic and Monetary
Union of the European Union requires a debt limit imposed of 60
percent to the GDP.104 These debt ceilings or limits, however, do not
usually come with strict rules. 105 The European Union uses a
combination of the "European Commission, European Council, and
European Court of Justice" to institute "fiscal rules mandating debt
brakes, borrowing restraints, deficit targets, and perpetually balanced
96. Shalifay, supra note 11.
97. See Stone, supra note 7.
98. See Shalifay, supra note 11.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
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budgets." 106 As some Member States in the European Union face
extreme financial strain, the European Union has put policy initiatives
into place in an attempt to "put vulnerable Member States back on the
path to fiscal sustainability."107
Separate from these organizations is the International Monetary
Fund, which boasts 189 member countries and serves as a resource in
handling sovereign debt. 108 The International Monetary Fund (also
called IMF or "the Fund") was created in July 1944 at a U.N. conference
in New Hampshire for the purpose of "ensur[ing] the stability of the
international monetary system."109 The Fund "work[s] to foster global
monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international
trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and
reduce poverty around the world." 110 The United States is a strong force
in the IMF; Washington, D.C. serves as its headquarters,111 and as of
2003, the United States had about 17.14 percent of the IMF voting
power. 112 The Fund serves as a watchdog to oversee other countries by
lending money to stabilize the economies of struggling countries and by
helping the country solve the problems that caused the difficulties. 113
However, the Fund is also aided by the World Bank Group, which is
described as a "development institution." 114
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
This section is broken up into two subparts: the first subpart is an
examination of domestic solutions and the second section is an
examination of international solutions. Both subparts have academic
support for their positions, but there is no clear solution. While there is
wide support for abolishing the debt ceiling, this is just one of many
proposed solutions.1 15 By considering solutions available both
domestically and internationally, one can gain a better understanding of
the choices the United States faces looking forward.
106. Arena, supra note 12, at 286.
107. Id. at 292.
108. About the IMF, IMF (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/about.htm
(boasting "near global membership."); Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to
Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 299, 300 (2005).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See Hagan, supra note 108, at 299.
113. See About the IMF, supra note 108.
114. Driscoll, supra note 84.
115. See Stone, supra note 7.
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A. Domestic Solutions
The United States' Congress could amend the debt limit statute, 31
U.S. Code § 3101, in many ways to benefit and keep the debt ceiling.
The United States could give more power to the executive branch, 116
make general amendments, 117 or enact changes based on three
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations. 118 While
these initial suggestions all function around the idea that the debt
ceiling should be amended, a more drastic solution of abolishing the
debt ceiling is also discussed to balance these proposals.
First, Congress could change the law to give more economic power to
the U.S. President when the debt ceiling is at capacity. 119 The executive
branch has previously tried this method in December 2012 with little,
arguably no, success. 120 The amendment would have allowed the
president "greater freedom" to lift the debt ceiling whenever
necessary. 121 Under the proposal rejected by the GOP leadership, the
president would have been empowered to effectively raise the limit
unless a two-thirds majority of Congress voted in opposition." 122 Second,
Congress could amend the law to change House and Senate rules
regarding the statute's use without ceding power to the executive
branch. 123 In addition to amendments to the statute itself, one
proponent of keeping the statute argues that there should be
amendments in conjunction with "internal legislative rules and budget
procedures" to hold Congress more responsible for its decisions
concerning the debt. 124
Alternatively, in 2015, the GAO gave three techniques the United
States could use to better the debt ceiling. 125 The GAO suggested first
that the United States allow the debt ceiling to "rise automatically or at
a minimum" and require debt limit legislation, free from any proposals
unrelated to the debt ceiling, each time a new budget is adopted. 126 In
116. See Zachary K. Ostro, In the Debt We Trust: The Unconstitutionality of Defaulting
on American Financial Obligations, and the Political Implications of their Perpetual
Validity, 51 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 241 (2014); see also Public Debt Limit, 31 U.S.C. § 3101
(2012).
117. See Krishnakumar, supra note 15, at 139.
118. See Stone, supra note 7.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Krishnakumar, supra note 15, at 139.
124. Id.
125. See Stone, supra note 7.
126. Id.
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effect, this would be carrying out what President Obama told
Republicans he would accept concerning debt ceiling negotiation. 127
Then, Congress would have to pass budgets consistent with the debt
limit.128 Second, the GAO recommended the president have the power
"to raise the debt limit as needed to cover bills incurred under existing
budget law." 129 To check this additional executive power, the GAO
suggested Congress would have a streamlined procedure in place to
lawfully reject this action when they felt the situation so warranted
it.130 Third, the GAO suggested that, instead of the president gaining
the power, the Treasury should be empowered to "borrow as needed." 131
Additionally, during the debt crisis in 2011, some experts went back
to a principle found in the U.S. Constitution, the Public Debt Clause, as
a legal remedy. 132 The Public Debt Clause, located in Section Four of the
Fourteenth Amendment 33 of the U.S. Constitution, provides: "The
validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
questioned." 134 This 1866 addition to the Constitution may be used as a
"tool" for the president to "use unilaterally to raise the debt ceiling if
Congress" does not lift it.135 This was called the "nuclear option" and
had popular proponents backing the idea, such as former President Bill
Clinton.136 This technique was not implemented during the 2011 debt
crisis and most likely will not be used in the future based on its
shortcomings. 137 Without a statute reining in a debt limit, investors
might be wary of buying into U.S. credit: "bond purchasers might
demand very high rates of interest for the 'radioactive' bonds,
destabilizing . . . markets." 138 Regardless, even though the 2011 debt
crisis has passed, some continue to support the strange idea of the
127. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 39, at 52-57.
128. See generally Stone, supra note 16 (describing Congress' options regarding debt
limits).
129. Stone, supra note 7.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. See Fagan, supra note 5, at 206; Public Debt Limit, 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012).
133. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
134. Fagan, supra note 5, at 206.
135. Id. at 206-07.
136. Neil H. Buchanan and Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional
Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2012).
137. See id. at 1178.
138. Id.
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United States' President choosing to essentially ignore the debt
ceiling. 139
Finally, the United States could get rid of its debt ceiling entirely
and instead rely on Congress to monitor its public debt through its
power over the budget. 140 This idea has been promoted during debt
ceiling discussions. 141 Opponents of the debt ceiling list several reasons
why they feel the limit is not needed. Critics point out that, excluding
Denmark, "every other democratic country ... does fine without one." 142
Further, no debt limit is written in the constitution, and Congress can
maintain its debt through its budget proposals without the inclusion of
the debt ceiling.1 43 Some opponents even believe the debt ceiling is
unconstitutional because it violates Section Four of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 144 Understandably, if people subscribe to the belief that
the debt ceiling is unconstitutional, this would create a heavy incentive
to get rid of it. 145 One law journal article holds that, to prove the limit is
unconstitutional, bondholders with standing would have to claim that
the debt ceiling "violate[s] both the Fourteenth Amendment's Public
Debt Clause and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause" because
they "suffer economic and noneconomic injuries." 146
If the government branches are in accord, this is more likely to
occur. 147 Following the 2016 U.S. election results, the United States is in
the unexpected position of having the first solution of removing the
ceiling come to fruition. According to economic analyst Jacob F.
Kierkegaard, while "[r]emoval of the debt ceiling is possible," it is
unlikely "unless one party controlled both houses of Congress and the
139. Id. at 1175. (arguing that if a political gridlock threatens the debt ceiling, the
President should simply ignore the debt ceiling, because he will be committing the "least
unconstitutional" option).
140. See Stone, supra note 7.
141. See Ruffing, supra note 9.
142. Surowiecki, supra note 18.
143. See id.
144. See Neil H. Buchanan and Michael C. Dorf, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Debt
Ceiling: When Negotiating Over Spending and Tax Laws, Congress and the President
Should Consider the Debt Ceiling a Dead Letter, 113 COLUM. REV. SIDEBAR 32, 33 (2013).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
145. See Victor Williams, Raze the Debt Ceiling: A Test Case for State-Sovereign and
Institutional Bondholder Litigation to Void the Debt Limit Statute, 72 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. ONLINE 96, 96 (2015).
146. Id. at 97.
147. Tom Risen, Why Do Only US and Denmark Have a Debt Ceiling?, US NEWS (Oct.
11, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/10/1 1/why-do-only-us-and-denmark-
have-a-debt-ceiling (quoting Jacob Funk Kirkegaard who works for the Peterson Institute
for International Economics).
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White House." 148 Kierkegaard continued by stating that the losing
political party "would always feel that they could extract some political
capital from it." 149 With Republicans in control of the presidency and
both houses of Congress, Kierkegaard's forecast becomes pertinent. 150
However, this prediction appeared to center on the controlling political
party acting in unison to overthrow the debt ceiling limit. 151 Instead,
during the latest political maneuverings around the debt ceiling,
Republican President Trump worked with members of the Democratic
Party to lift and then suspend the debt ceiling. 152 This suggests that
what the President feels about the debt ceiling may differ from his other
conservative counterparts' feelings on the matter. 153 As a result,
President Trump's arrangements concerning the ceiling may not align
to bring Kierkegaard's prediction into reality. 154
B. International Solutions
Because domestic solutions appear to be difficult to implement, the
answer to America's debt problems could rest with international
solutions. 155 The United States could adopt techniques used by other
countries to better its relationship with its debt. 156 This could either be
through adopting Denmark's use of the debt ceiling, 157 another country's
debt ceiling, 158 or through utilizing a debt-to-GDP ratio. 159
The first option is to use Denmark's debt ceiling strategy. 160 The
United States could set a debt limit that is much higher than its normal
amount, with the hope of cutting off the need for frequent incremental
adjustments as annual budgets surpass the limit. 161 The Danish debt
ceiling "was never intended to play any role in day-to-day politics,"
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See 2016 Election Results, CNN POLITICS, http://www.cnn.com/election/2016/results
(last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
151. See Risen, supra note 147.
152. Thomas Kaplan, Senate Votes to Raise Debt Limit and Approves $15 Billion in
Hurricane Relief, NY TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/
politics/senate-harvey-irma-aid.html; Sahadi, supra note 34.
153. See id.
154. See Risen, supra note 147.
155. See id.
156. See generally Shalifay, supra note 11.
157. Stone, supra note 16 (writing on the subject of the debt ceiling that "it's best to
scrap it entirely, but the Danes have the second best idea.").
158. See Shalifay, supra note 11.
159. See Stone, supra note 7.
160. Id.
161. See id.
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unlike the United States where politics have become intertwined with
the debt limit.162 For this strategy to be fully executed, Congress must
amend the debt statute to substantially increase the limit, rather than
increase or suspend it enough to last only an uncertain number of years.
Alternatively, the adoption of other countries' debt ceiling or debt
limit procedures is also an appealing possibility. 163 For instance,
Malaysia does not have a legally binding debt limit but instead one that
its Minister of Finance has the power to change as he sees fit. 164
Practically applying this solution could mean that the United States can
give the president more power over the debt limit, but as previously
discussed, this solution would not be one openly embraced by
Congress. 165
Others argue that the United States should adopt a debt-to-GDP
ratio. The United States can look internationally to discover what ratio
might be most helpful. For instance, in the 1990s, the European Union
and IMF implemented a debt ratio of 60 percent of GDP or less for
Member Countries. 166 There is no economic evidence that a specific ratio
should be upheld above others, be it sixty percent or any other percent,
though; "IMF staff have made clear that the 60 percent criterion is
arbitrary and should not guide near-term fiscal policy in the wake of the
recent financial crisis."167 Just as the IMF found no "clear debt
threshold," there is no golden ratio that would be perfect for the United
States. 168 Therefore, if the United States followed this international
measure to limit their public debt, the creation of the ratio would be
entirely discretionary.
Similarly, as economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff
admit, "there is no 'magic threshold' for the debt ratio" that signifies
"slower economic growth." 169 If the United States experiences spending
cuts and higher revenues, the United States could set a debt-to-GDP
ratio. 170 Despite this, on the surface it would be better if the United
States could adopt and limit itself to "a lower debt-to-GDP ratio . . .
because of the additional flexibility it provides policymakers facing
economic or financial crises and the lower interest burden it carries." 171
162. Id.
163. See Shalifay, supra note 11.
164. Id.
165. See Ostro, supra note 116, at 242-43.
166. Stone, supra note 7.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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The United States could also adopt rules similar to the European
Union's Fiscal Compact as argued in Michael Arena's 2014 journal
article.172 Arena claims that the adoption of a similar compact in the
United States "would more effectively induce long-term budgetary
discipline and better incentivize sustainable fiscal policy." 173 The ability
to set sanctions against persistent violations could encourage Congress
to follow the rules, rather than follow political avenues.174 For this to
occur, Congress would have to pass statutory rules that are
economically far-sighted.1 75 However, creating these rules would take
away the legislature's frequent power to holdout on increasing the debt
ceiling when there is contentious legislation being circulated with which
Congress disagrees. 176
IV. ARGUMENT: APPLYING THE BEST INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS
Because the U.S. debt ceiling has an international scope of influence
and remains a contentious area of law, the importance of finding a
solution cannot be underestimated. The stakes are high; a solution must
be found to America's debt ceiling problem. 177 In 2011, Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner warned: "[D]efault by the United States is
unthinkable. This is not a new or partisan judgment; it is a conclusion
that has been shared by every Secretary of the Treasury, regardless of
political party, in the modem era." 178 Now, just as 2018 is beginning, the
long-held threat of a potential default still looms just as large.
Considering the current state of affairs, one must look internationally to
discover what America's best strategy would be to avoid future partisan
stalemates or the harsh consequences that Congress not lifting the
ceiling could bring, such as default, financial devastation, and higher
interest rates for the country. 179 While there have been plenty of
domestic solutions discussed in the academic community, the best
solution is to take an international approach and apply what the United
States can acquire from a comparative, international lens. 180
172. See Arena, supra note 12, at 286.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 294.
175. See id. at 296.
176. See id. at 297.
177. See generally Stone, supra note 7 (expressing the need for policymakers to "buckle
down and make compromises.").
178. Arena, supra note 12, at 285.
179. See Surowiecki, supra note 18.
180. See generally Stone, supra note 16 (arguing that if the United States keeps a debt
ceiling it should be modeled after the one in Denmark).
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I argue that the United States should keep politics separate from
the debt ceiling to such a degree as is reasonable using one of two
international solution approaches. To accomplish this, the United States
could either mirror Denmark's debt ceiling where the limit is much
higher than necessary, or, in the alternative, attach their debt ceiling to
a high GDP limit as applied in other countries. 18 1 Furthermore, I
disagree with critics who wish to demolish the debt ceiling entirely. 182
To explain why America should adopt the traits of one of the two
aforementioned international forms of a debt limit, it is first important
to argue in favor of why the debt ceiling should continue and not be
destroyed. While most critics seem to believe that getting rid of the debt
ceiling to have no limit or ratio is the best solution, 183 this idea seems to
disregard or belittle any benefits attached to the limit. Proponents of
the debt limit statute believe the statute does serve purposes worthy of
keeping the statute in place. 184 When one combines the two main
purposes of the debt ceiling,185 it showcases why lawmakers should
consider amending the statute, rather than merely getting rid of it.
One purpose Americans can claim of their debt ceiling is "what the
political theorist Jon Elster calls a 'precommitment device'-a way of
keeping ourselves from acting recklessly in the future." 186 There have
been notable instances where the debt limit has successfully acted in
such a capacity. 187 For example, the "the Gramm-Rudman debates of
1985 and the 'budget summit' of 1990" both represent situations in
which "the need to raise the debt ceiling may have played a role in
prompting policymakers to take action aimed at reducing projected
deficits."188 Critics will note that these circumstances are rare and that
the decision to reduce the U.S. deficit springs from different sources. 189
However, simply because these checks do not outwardly occur
frequently does not mean potential future checks should be barred by
the absence of a debt ceiling. The debt ceiling statute is "the last
remnant of congressional control or accountability over the national
debt," and ridding the nation of this accountability check would do this
nation a deep disservice. 190
181. See Shalifay, supra note 11.
182. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 7.
183. See Debt Ceiling, IGM FORUM (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/
debt-ceiling.
184. See Krishnakumar, supra note 15, at 137.
185. See id.
186. Surowiecki, supra note 18.
187. See Ruffing, supra note 9.
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. Krishnakumar, supra note 15, at 137.
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The debt statute also serves the purpose of acting as a device that
"encourages legislators to consider the interests of the general public
and future generations, rather than those of special interests." 191 The
latter purpose may have been obscured over the last decades, 192
especially in the past few years with Republican House of
Representatives members pitted against the Democratic President
Obama over debt ceiling increases, 193 but that does not mean Congress
will always rise to such partisan levels. With hope, the partisan division
controlling the 2010s is fated to be an anomaly rather than an accurate
indication of how Congress and the executive branch will interact in the
future. It seems unreasonable to get rid of the debt ceiling completely
when other alternatives may decrease its noticeable flaw:
partisanship. 194
Instead of destroying the debt ceiling, the United States should first
consider embracing Denmark's use of the debt ceiling. 195 Denmark has
successfully kept politics out of the debt ceiling, while in the United
States it seems like politics is all too pervasive in negotiations around
the ceiling.196 Though perhaps some of the reason the United States is
overly partisan and Denmark is not can be explained by their political
system differences; adopting a comparable high limit like Denmark
imposes could still certainly aid the United States by taking the burden
of constantly having to adjust the debt limit away. 197 If the United
States adopted Denmark's limit system by raising its debt to the same
degree, Congress could amend the limit to be almost three times as
much money as the debt the United States currently owns. 198 This
hypothetical sum could allow the United States to end its frequent debt
crises for a substantial time. 199
If America wants to pose a limit quantified in a different way, a
debt-to-GDP ratio could also be an appealing solution. 200 Because the
debt-to-GDP ratio is different than the American numerical value in
place, it may appear to be a less attractive solution to America's debt
ceiling. This does not make the implementation or ability to reduce
191. Id.
192. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 39, at 52-53.
193. See id. at 56-57.
194. See Stone, supra note 7.
195. See Stone, supra note 16.
196. See, e.g., Schlesinger, supra note 37.
197. See Sahadi, supra note 3 (explaining that "on average," a debt limit crisis takes
place in America "more than once a year").
198. Stone, supra note 16.
199. See id.
200. See Shalifay, supra note 11.
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partisanship any less plausible, though.201 Unlike other countries where
accountability is an issue, the United States is one country where
accountability is ensured through its high position in the international
economy. 202 Large debt agencies have the power to strip the United
States of its credit rating, a potential deterrent for the government to
ignore or breach its ratio, as is experienced in other countries. 203 There
is an expectation that America follows the rule of law, meaning in part
that "power" will not "be exercised arbitrarily" here.204 Because people
have faith in the presence of this fundamental value in the United
States, there is no chance the nation will misrepresent its debt ratio, a
fault other countries have committed. 205
For this international prototype to work, however, the ratio must be
a high enough percentage to prevent Congress from having to quickly
raise the ratio.206 Raising the debt ceiling or switching to a debt-to-GDP
ratio would allow the continuation of a check on national debt and
against "interest group politics," 207 but the check would likely take on a
more passive role. Instead of funneling time and intellectual resources
into amending the debt limit each year or so, House of Representatives
members could devote that time and energy to other uses. 208
Both of these international solutions rely on a positive assumption
that delaying the constant need to adjust the debt limit long enough will
preserve the functionality of the limit until circumstances require an
adjustment and political parties are more willing to compromise. 209
According to scholars, the United States is "living in an age of
astonishing political partisanship by public officials." 210 If this severe
partisanship trend is short-lived or diminishes in the future, acting now
to either raise the debt limit to a higher nominal level or raise it to a
high debt-to-GDP ratio could allow the United States to keep the debt
statute, and more importantly, retain its accountability. 211
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. Gosalbo-Bono, supra note 14, at 231.
205. See Shalifay, supra note 11.
206. See generally Stone, supra note 16 (describing where Denmark realized a high
amount "far in excess of outstanding debt").
207. Krishnakumar, supra note 15, at 137.
208. See, Sahadi, supra note 3 (stating how often Congress must adjust the ceiling).
209. See Shalifay, supra note 11.
210. Justin Levitt, The Partisanship Spectrum, 55 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1787, 1790
(2014).
211. See generally Shalifay, supra note 11 (noting how Denmark raised its limit to such
a number that the country is "in no danger of default.").
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CONCLUSION
The past few decades have shown the negative effects partisan
grandstanding has taken on the debt ceiling in the United States. 212 The
debt ceiling has become a game of chicken, with serious consequences
hanging in the balance.2 13 The domestic approaches to repairing the
U.S. debt ceiling through amendment appear to fall short. 2 14 Instead, by
looking at other countries and trying to mirror their approach, Congress
can amend the debt ceiling to a level that will put it above the political
fray. If the United States adopts a limit high enough that there will not
be a repeat of 2010 to the present, when every few years a debt ceiling
impasse would draw the nation's attention, politicians can put an end to
this dangerous game of chicken. 215 Denmark's numerical limit is already
most similar to the debt limit in place, 216 and heavily raising the limit
can be done without extraneous amendments to the system as some
domestic alternatives require. 217 In the alternative, adjusting to a high
debt-to-GDP ratio instead of the current limit may also accomplish the
same results and keep partisanship at bay. 2 18 Implementing either of
these international solutions can maintain the integrity of the debt
limit, but if political partisanship does not lessen over time, lawmakers
may have to revisit other available options, such as choosing to rid the
nation of the debt ceiling.2 19
212. See Buchanan, supra note 39, at 52, 57.
213. See Stone, supra note 7.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See Shalifay, supra note 11.
217. See Stone, supra note 16.
218. See generally Shalifay, supra note 11 (noting how Denmark raised its debt limit
and is "touted as a role model for how the US should operate under a debt ceiling.").
219. See generally Stone, supra note 7 (stating the "anachronistic nature of this ceiling
has been a source of contention every time there has been a government shutdown or near
default, most notably in 1995, 2011, and now 2013.").
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